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The bigness of smallness:
The financial crisis, its contagion 
mechanisms and its effects in 
Latin America
Daniel Titelman, Esteban Pérez Caldentey, Ramón Pineda
This paper has two purposes. First, it seeks to explain the reason why a 
relatively small shock (in the subprime market in the United States) had 
a systemic effect on the world economy. It is argued that this responds 
to the combination of off balance sheet funding and pro-cyclical leverage 
management. Second, it analyses the transmission mechanisms and the 
possible effects of the crisis on Latin American economies. Past crises had 
generalized, deep and enduring effects across the region, and restricted 
access to external finance and the disruption of international trade turned 
out to be their main channels transmission. In spite of specificities, the 
current episode and its manifestations are not an exception to the pattern 
of previous crises. The final outcome will depend on the type of recovery 
that takes place in the developed world and on the effectiveness of the 
counter-cyclical policies applied in Latin America.
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1 Blanchard (2008) poses a similar question: ‘how can such a small 
trigger have such enormous effects’, which is the basic question 
surrounding the current crisis. For analyses along similar lines, see 
Eichengreen (2009) and Greenlaw et. al. (2008).
The current international financial crisis, which is 
considered to be the most severe since the Great 
Depression, is set in the context of unprecedented global 
imbalances and high levels of international liquidity. 
The build up of liquidity was channelled through the 
banking system to the real estate sector, including to 
borrowers with a high risk profile, significantly bidding 
up initially house prices and eventually those of other 
assets as well. This was facilitated and enhanced by 
a process of financial innovation in the context of 
unregulated markets. 
The current international crisis began in a relatively 
small segment of the real estate market of the United 
States, the subprime market, which represented roughly 
4% of all United States financial assets. However, the 
crisis did not remain focalized within that submarket 
and the consequent contagion effects, felt in the real 
and financial sectors of the developed world, have by 
far outstripped the initial losses. Moreover, the effects 
have also spread to emerging market regions of the 
world, including Latin America.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it 
seeks to shed light on one of the most fundamental and 
enduring questions regarding the crisis, namely: how 
can a shock to such a small segment of the real estate 
market in the United States trigger such a worldwide 
debacle?1 In other words, how can something so small 
turn into something so big? Second, bearing in mind 
the systemic character of the crisis, the paper identifies 
the possible effects of the crisis on Latin American 
economies and transmission mechanisms involved. 
The paper is structured accordingly in two parts.
The first part argues that the disproportion 
between the relatively small size of the sector that 
triggered the crisis (the subprime sector) and the 
importance of the magnitude of its effects on asset 
values and the systemic worldwide contagion is rooted 
in the combination of off  balance sheet funding and 
pro-cyclical leverage management. Off balance sheet 
funding set the stage for the crisis, and pro-cyclical 
leverage management acted as the amplifier mechanism. 
This combination led eventually to a contagion process 
characterized by generalized and cumulative asset 
price deflation, which led to significant contractions 
in financial institutions’ balance sheets. This in turn 
reduced financial institutions’ lending capacity and 
paved the way for a worldwide credit crunch. 
The second part provides an analysis of  the 
transmission mechanisms of the current crisis and 
its effects on Latin American economies using as 
a benchmark past crises, including the debt crisis 
(1980-1983), the United States savings and loan 
crisis (1987-91), the Mexican crisis (1994-1995), the 
Asian-Russian crisis (1997-1999) and the Argentine 
crisis (2001-2002).2
The analysis indicates that, in general, international 
financial crises have deep and enduring negative effects 
on the region’s economies. Also, the evidence presented 
shows that the main transmission channels, albeit 
not always acting jointly, include restricted access to 
external finance and the contraction of international 
trade flows. Both transmission channels are present in 
the current episode even though the initial effects of 
the crisis have not been as severe as in past episodes. 
Finally, regardless of countries’ initial conditions, the 
negative economic results and the restricted access 
to external finance has affected a large number of 
countries across the region. In short, the available 
empirical evidence suggests that in the case of Latin 
I
introduction
2 Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996), De Gregorio and Valdés 
(1999), Calvo and Mendoza (2000), Forbes and Rigobon (2001), 
Rigobon (2001), Edwards (1999) and Kamisnky, Reinhart and Vegh 
(2002) have identified several critical moments in the international 
financial markets that could be considered as systemic crisis. These 
episodes include the debt crisis in early 1980s, the Mexican crisis 
of 1994, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian Crisis of 1998, the 
Brazilian crisis of 1999, the long term capital management crisis 
of  2000, the Argentine crisis of  2001 and the Turkish crisis of 
2002. Other examples in the literature on financial crises, such as 
Levean and Valencia (2008) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a), 
have identified episodes such as the savings and loan crisis in the 
mid-1980s, and the Scandinavian and the Japanese crises of the 
early 1990s as part of the “big five” financial crises in terms of 
financial cost.
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America, the current episode and its manifestations 
are not an exception to the patterns of previous crises 
and that, as suggested by Pineda, Pérez-Caldentey and 
Titelman (2009), the current episode might well turn 
out to be a case of “old wine in new goatskins.” 
The strength of  the expected effects will be 
nonetheless shaped by the duration and intensity 
of the crisis in the developed economies and by the 
effectiveness of the counter-cyclical policies announced 
by Latin American governments.
II
The build-up and propagation of the global 
financial crisis
1. The macroeconomic setting for the financial 
crisis
The current crisis took place in a context of global 
imbalances: an external account deficit in the United 
States, which was by far the largest and most persistent 
in the country’s economic history, that was mirrored by 
significant current account surpluses in the economies 
of Asia (in particular China) and to a lesser extent in 
Middle Eastern countries.
The increased demand for dollars which translated 
initially into an appreciation of the dollar and the 
concomitant build-up in liquidity allowed the Federal 
Reserve Bank to undertake an expansionary monetary 
policy while keeping inflation at bay. The expansionary 
policy lasted until 2005 as shown by the decline in 
the Federal Funds Rate from 6.1% to 1.0% between 
January 2000 and May 2004. Monetary policy became 
less expansive thereafter. Increased liquidity was also 
present in world financial markets as the evolution of 
the libor rate mirrored the movement in the Federal 
Fund rate.3
The build-up of liquidity set the stage for increased 
lending by the financial system to the residential real 
estate sector including to high credit risk borrowers 
(the subprime market) leading to a rapid rise in house 
prices and the formation of bubble in the housing 
market.4 The empirical evidence shows that in the five 
years prior to the unfolding of the crisis the ratio of 
private sector credit to gdp rose from 169% to 209%. 
Also, the increase in liquidity was accompanied by 
an accumulated increase in real estate properties 
reaching 184%.
The increase in loans to high credit risk borrowers 
was facilitated and enhanced by a process of 
deregulation and financial innovation in the context 
of unregulated markets which permitted excessive risk-
taking as a result of changes in the incentive structure 
and the relaxation and virtual circumvention of existing 
financial regulations and prudential provisions.5
2. how could such a small trigger cause such 
a worldwide debacle?
The housing price bubble eventually stopped expanding 
when real estate prices suffered a significant decline 
between 2006 and 2008 (30%). The ensuing initial 
3 These macroeconomic and financial conditions are not exclusive to 
the current situation; they were also present in other financial crises, 
including the Latin American debt crisis, the savings and loan crisis, 
the Nordic countries crisis, the Japanese crisis, the Asian crisis and 
the dot-com crisis, as shown in Table 11 in the Appendix.
4 The subprime market gained importance as of the mid-1990s and 
especially from 2003 onwards. Data available for 2001-2006 shows 
that new subprime loans increased from US$ 120 billion to US$ 600 
billion. A decade ago, five percent of mortgage loan originations 
were subprime; by 2005 the figure had jumped to approximately 20 
percent. Currently, there are about US$1.3 trillion in outstanding 
subprime loans, with over US$ 600 billion in new subprime loans 
originating in 2006.
5 The possibilities of extending loans and borrowing were expanded 
for financial intermediaries by several means. These included 
the relaxation of geographical and activity limitations on bank 
holding companies and new regulatory interpretations of existing 
law. They also comprised the expansion of activities of depository 
institutions to allow them to act like commercial banks, the repeal 
of the separation of commercial and investment banking imposed 
in the Banking Act of 1933, and the creation of new entities, such 
as private equity firms and hedge funds, within the financial sector. 
One important example is the Commodity Futures Modernization 
Act (2000) which preceded the 2007 crisis. The Act established a 
series of provisions affecting the regulatory and supervisory roles 
of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. At a practical level, however, the act 
shielded the market for derivatives from federal regulation and 
thus inevitably led to riskier financial practices.
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defaults and losses were mainly limited to subprime 
mortgage loans and securities. The subprime mortgage 
sector is a small component of the residential sector, 
consisting mostly of  lower-income lenders. These 
represented roughly 20% of all mortgage loans in 
2007 and 4% of all United States assets. The losses 
on subprime loans and securities amounted to only 
roughly US$ 400 billion.6
However, the consequent effects of  the crisis 
have by far outstripped the initial losses. Indeed it is 
estimated that the cumulative declines of United States 
real estate wealth and of stock market capitalization 
values one year after the subprime crisis reached 
roughly US$ 1 trillion and US$ 7 trillion dollars, 
respectively. 
In addition, far from remaining focalized within 
the subprime sector of the United States, the crisis has 
spread widely to affect some of the most important 
financial institutions in the United States and in other 
developed countries. Moreover, the contagion effects 
have also reached the emerging market regions of the 
world. Currently it is estimated that the cumulative 
decline of world gdp, relative to its trend, surpasses 
US$ 3 trillion.7
The disproportion between the relatively small size 
of the sector which triggered the crisis (the subprime 
sector) and the importance of the magnitude of its 
effects on asset values and stock market capitalization 
and the systemic worldwide contagion beg an answer 
to the question posed in the title of this section.8
The answer lies in the combination of  the 
widespread adoption of off  balance sheet funding 
and pro-cyclical leverage management practices. Off 
balance sheet funding and pro-cyclical management 
practices are respectively analysed in the following two 
sections. As shown, these practices provided a working 
mechanism for financial contagion through generalized 
asset price declines and balance sheet contraction. 
The end result was a worldwide credit crunch and a 
global slowdown of economic growth. 
(a) Off balance sheet funding
Off balance sheet funding is a form of funding 
that enables a firm to obtain finance: (i) without at 
the same time showing debt on its balance sheet and
(ii) through the issue of high credit rated securities against 
a collateral pool of risky assets (i.e., securitization).9 
As such it enables financial institutions to obtain 
liquidity, improve the debt ratios that analysts use to 
assess the financial risk of a firm and expand their 
borrowing capacity.10
In the subprime crisis episode, off  balance sheet 
financing was instrumented through the creation of 
new and independent legal entities termed special 
purpose vehicles (spvs) and the sale to spvs of  a 
designated portfolio of assets that included residential 
mortgage loans.
Against this designated portfolio of assets (i.e., 
collaterals), the spvs issued liabilities (i.e., debt) 
in the form of  fixed income securities to be sold 
to investors. The fixed income securities, which 
represented a significant part of the equity of major 
banks in the developed world, are known as asset-
backed securities (or more precisely in the subprime 
episode as mortgage-backed securities) (see table 1). 
Collateralized debt obligations (cdos) are a special 
type of asset-backed security.11
6 This estimate is provided by Blanchard (2008) and refers to the 
losses of subprime loans and securities by October 2007. This is 
the same estimate as that provided by Greenlaw et al. (2008). The 
estimate provided by Hatzius (2008) is slightly higher and of the 
order of US$ 500 billion.
7 These estimates are based on Blanchard (2008). 
8 See, Eichengreen (2009), Greenlaw et al. (2008); Blanchard (2008); 
Hatzius (2008); Adrian and Shin (2008 a/, 2008 b/, 2008 c/) for an 
analysis of the effects of the crisis focusing on the disproportion 
between the trigger of the crisis and its effects. Prior to the crisis 
a similar question was posed by Bernanke et al. (1996), namely, 
how can small impulses provide large aggregate fluctuations in 
economic activity? These authors named this mechanism the 
financial accelerator. The IMF poses a similar question in the 
World Economic Outlook published in April 2009 (see page 2, 
Chapter 1).
9 A more general definition is “any form of funding that avoids 
placing owners’ equity, liabilities or assets on a firm’s balance sheet.” 
By contrast, using balance sheet funding means making any form 
of funding, whether equity or debt, appear on the balance sheet 
(see, http://www.riskglossary.com).
10 Up until the eruption of  the 2007-2008 subprime crisis, the 
major investment banks of the United States included Bear Sterns, 
Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley. Bear Sterns collapsed in 2008 and was sold to JP Morgan 
Chase. In spite of having weathered the Great Depression, Merrill 
Lynch also collapsed during the 2007 crisis and was sold in 2008 
to Bank of America. Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in 
2008 and was bought by Barclays plc. Finally, Morgan Stanley 
and Goldman Sachs survived the crisis but were converted into 
commercial banking institutions in 2008. 
11 This is referred to in the literature as securitization. It is defined 
as the process of pooling assets of varying quality and risk in order 
to repackage them into tranches of securities that differ in liquidity, 
maturity, contingency and risk, and each appeal to a particular 
clientele of investors. Securitization started in the 1970’s as a way 
for financial institutions and corporations to find new sources of 
funding —either by moving assets off  their balance sheets or by 
borrowing against them to refinance at a lower market rate.
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The spv transferred the proceeds received from 
the sale of securities to the originating institution. 
Thus, the originating institution increased the value 
of its assets without showing a concomitant increase 
in its liabilities (debt) on its balance sheet.
The value of the principal and the interest yielded 
by these securities issued by the spv depended on 
the cash flow produced by the designated portfolio 
of assets, that is, by residential mortgage loans. The 
SPV guaranteed that it was in a position to make 
the payments on its debt commitments by de-linking 
the credit quality of the securities it issued from the 
solvency status of the originating financial institution 
(in other words, bankruptcy was an extremely remote 
possibility for the spv). 
The spv provided further protection to investors 
against possible losses on the underlying assets by 
dividing the securities issued into slices (i.e., tranches) of 
different seniority, broadly-speaking senior, mezzanine 
and junior tranches. In the case of subprime mortgages, 
the most junior tranche was overcollateralized.12 The 
spv tranching process implied that payments on the 
securities were to be first made to the senior tranches, 
then to the mezzanine tranches and then to the junior 
ones. Losses were first absorbed by the junior tranches, 
then by the mezzanine tranches and then ultimately 
by the senior tranches. 
This process of subordination acted as a form 
of  credit protection and enhancement because it 
protected senior asset tranches against loss of payments 
stemming from defaults and guaranteed a very high 
probability of payment. Subordination ensures that, 
as noted by Nadauld and Sherlund (2008 p.9), “loans 
that default first will destroy the principal balance of 
the overcollateralization before touching any tranche 
more senior. Only after the overcollateralization 
principal has been fully exhausted will defaults accrue 
to the next most junior tranche. Thus senior tranches 
benefit from ‘thick’ junior tranches, and in this way, 
subordination acts as a form of credit protection.” 
Following the logic of  this prioritization and 
subordination scheme, the most senior tranches were 
also the ones that received the highest credit ratings, 
followed by the mezzanine and junior tranches. 
The design of spvs implied that even if the senior 
security tranches were issued against risky collateral 
(such as subprime mortgage loans), these securities 
would still receive a high credit rating, that is, they 
would be considered ‘prime’ securities. This is due, 
in the first stage, to the fact that the credit rating 
of the securities issued by the spvs are, by virtue of 
their creation, independent or again ‘delinked’ from 
the credit quality of the originator or issuer of the 
asset (or collateral) in question.13 In a second stage, 
the spvs would also provide further protection to 
the senior tranches against losses on the underlying 
assets by guaranteeing the respective payments on 
principal and interest.
TABLE 1
Percentage of asset-backed securities over equity for selected financial institutions
Financial Institution Country Asset-backed securities Equity Asset-backed securities
  (US$ billion) (US$ billion) over equity
    (In percentages)
Citibank United States 93 120 77.4
ABN Amro Europe 69 34 201.1
Bank of  America United States 46 136 33.7
hbo Europe 44 42 105.6
JP Morgan Chase United States 42 116 36.1
hsbc Europe 39 123 32.1
Societé Générale Europe  39 44 87.2
Deutsche bank Europe 38 44 87.8
Barclays Europe 33 54 61.5
WestLB Europe 30 9 336.6
Source: Acharya and Richardson (2009).
12 A tranche is said to be overcollaterilized when ‘the principal 
balance of  the mortgage loans exceeded the principal balance 
of all the securities (debt) issued by the spv.’ See Aschcraft and 
Shuermann (2008, p. 29). 13 That is, the spv is bankruptcy remote.
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In the case of the subprime crisis episode, the 
representative subprime mortgage securitization 
structure concentrated the bulk of  the investment 
in the senior asset tranches. Empirical evidence for 
the period 1997-2007 shows that the total principal 
balance of  senior tranches represented on average 
81% of total principal deals.14
In summary, the off balance sheet practice allowed 
the transformation of risky assets (such as subprime 
mortgages) into ‘safe and high credit rated securities.’ 
At the same time, the deconstruction of a financial 
TABLE 2
Steps in the off balance-securitization process 
and its consequences for risk assessment
Steps in the off  balance-securitization process Consequences for risk assessment
Step 1: 
A mortgage lender, such as a bank, extends a loan 
through a broker or agent to a homeowner.
Brokers and agents are paid an up-front fee that is unadjusted for borrower 
quality. Bonuses reward the growth of  business. Brokers and agents are 
not part of  the bank staff  and thus outside regulation.
Step 2:
The mortgage lender then sells the loan to one of  the 
government-sponsored enterprises or agencies or to a 
private entity, such as a bank or finance company (an 
investment bank). 
Mortgage lenders have no incentives to closely scrutinize borrower quality 
as they are aware that products would be repackaged and sold. Mortgage 
lenders did not hold assets to maturity.
Profits create incentives to mortgage lenders to obtain new loans.
The lender can still service the mortgage, making this process invisible 
to the borrower. 
Step 3:
The agency or private entity, through a SPV, then takes 
a number of  the mortgage loans it has purchased and 
bundles them together into a “pool” product (the actual 
number of  individual mortgages in the pool can vary 
from a few to thousands of  loans). 
Step 4:
The SPV then sells claims on the cash flow generated 
by the pool of  mortgages, in the form of  securities, to 
investors. After the initial sale, these securities trade on 
the open market. 
The mortgage-backed securities are created through financial entities 
known as special purpose vehicles (SPVs) which are not under the control 
of  banks and have an off  balance sheet status.
The existence of tranching allows the construction of products with ratings 
suitable only for certain types of  investment.
Rating agencies make a large share of  their profit from rating these ‘pool’ 
products.
Fund managers receive bonuses for enhancing portfolio performance.
Mortgage payments, consisting of  interest and principal, 
are passed through the chain, from the mortgage servicer 
to the bondholder.
Source: on the basis of  Gorton (2008) and Ashcraft & Schuermann (2008).
institution into an on-balance entity (the institution 
itself) and an off  balance one (the spv) allowed the 
former (through the transfer of  income receipts 
from the off  balance institution) to have access to an 
untapped source of financing and liquidity, without 
showing at the same time, the corresponding debt on 
their balance sheets. 
The procedure made it very difficult to judge 
and value risk because it led to an opaque ownership 
structure that obscured the identity of the agents holding 
the underlying risk. Also the lack of transparency 
tended to result in the mispricing of asset values. The 
process of off balance sheet funding cum securitization 
and its main consequences for assessing risk are 
summarized in table 2 below.14 See Gorton (2008).
13
ThE biGNESS of SMALLNESS: ThE fiNANCiAL CriSiS, iTS CoNTAGioN MEChANiSMS AND iTS EffECTS
In LATIn AmERICA  •  DAnIEL TITELmAn, ESTEbAn PéREz CALDEnTEy, RAmón PInEDA
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 8  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 9
TABLE 3
Mortgage originations and Subprime Securitization
Year Total mortgage Subprime Subprime share in Subprime Percentage of
 originations originations total originations mortgage-backed subprime securitized
 (US$ billions) (US$ billions) (Percentage of  securities mortgages (Percentage
   dollar value) (US$ billions) of dollar value)
2001 2 215 190 8.6 95 50.4
2002 2 885 231 8.0 121 52.7
2003 3 945 335 8.5 202 60.5
2004 2 920 540 18.5 401 74.3
2005 3 120 625 20.0 507 81.2
2006 2 980 600 20.1 483 80.5
Source: Gorton (2008).
The process of off  balance sheet funding and 
securitization was successfully applied over time to 
subprime mortgage loan-based originations in the 
United States as long as the spot and future price 
(value) of the underlying asset (collateral) showed an 
upward trend, which happened to be the case during 
the boom phase. Table 3 shows that between 2001 and 
2006, the percentage of subprime mortgage loans that 
were securitized increased from 50% to 81% of total 
subprime loans.
However, in the ‘distress phase’, when real estate 
prices collapsed, it became clear that the off  balance 
sheet model, through its separation of  real risk 
from financial risk and investor protection with the 
‘tranching’ of  securities, had encouraged excessive 
risk taking and thereby increased the vulnerability 
and fragility of financial institutions’ balance sheets. 
More to the point, it showed that securities could be 
downgraded to ‘subprime’ just as quickly during the 
bust as they had risen to ‘prime’ during the boom. 
(b) Pro-cyclical leverage as the amplifying 
mechanism
The losses resulting from the decline in real 
estate sector values were not limited to the subprime 
mortgage sector; they were witnessed among some 
of the most important financial institutions in the 
United States and other parts of the world as well. 
This can be explained by the widespread adoption 
of the combination of high leverage ratios (which 
shows an extensive reliance on debt financing) and 
pro-cyclical leverage management practices.15 
The leverage ratio reflects the extent to which 
financial intermediaries use debt to finance the 
acquisition of assets. The greater the leverage ratio 
of a financial intermediary is, the greater its level of 
indebtedness. Relying heavily on debt financing may 
impact negatively on the credit rating of a financial 
intermediary and make it difficult for funds to be 
raised in the future.
In addition, since equity is a cushion against 
insolvency, the greater the dependency on debt 
financing, the smaller the buffer that the financial 
intermediary in question has against any unforeseen 
change in asset values. In short, relying heavily on 
debt financing implies that a financial intermediary 
assumes a higher risk by becoming more exposed 
and vulnerable to illiquidity and, more importantly, 
to insolvency. 
However, although leverage ratios that show an 
extensive reliance on debt financing entail greater 
risks, they also create significant profit opportunities 
since the higher the leverage ratio, the higher the rate 
15 Obviously, as shown below, the leverage ratios are higher for 
financial institutions such as the investment banks that are not 
subject to the regulation applied to commercial banks. 
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of return over equity.16 In this sense, the expectation 
of higher profitability provides a significant incentive 
to overleverage.
In congruence with this, the available empirical 
evidence on the leverage ratios across regions and 
countries indicates that financial institutions rely 
extensively on debt financing. In 2007, the commercial 
banks of the United States exhibited average leverage 
ratios of 10-12, while those recorded by investment 
banks were higher, reaching the 20-30 range. In the 
case of Japan, the average leverage ratio stands at 18 
and in Europe it reached 34 (see figure 1 below).17
Moreover, available empirical evidence also 
indicates that, the correlation coefficient for the 
period 1990-2007 between the average leverage ratio 
of the most important banks in the United States 
and that of  earnings over equity is equal to 0.69, 
and that it is statistically significant at the 95% level 
of confidence.
Financial institutions not only exhibit high leverage 
ratios, but also manage leverage on a pro-cyclical 
basis. In other words, banks adjust their leverage in 
reaction to a rise or fall in the value of their balance 
sheet assets. More precisely, they tend to adjust the 
leverage ratio upwards when the economy experiences a 
boom and asset prices increase. Contrarily, banks tend 
to adjust the leverage ratio downwards (deleverage) 
when the economy experiences a recession and asset 
prices decline.18
Pro-cyclical leverage management is explained 
by risk considerations. Financial institutions and 
other firms adjust their balance sheet according to the 
expected risk of loss on their asset portfolios. During 
boom conditions, the expected risk of loss among 
financial institutions and other firms is low and, as a 
result, they tend to increase their leverage by acquiring 
assets through debt financing. Contrarily, during bust 
conditions, the expected risk of loss among financial 
institutions and other firms is high and, as a result, 
they tend to deleverage by selling assets with a view 
to reducing debt.
The available empirical evidence for the United 
States investment banks shows that these financial 
institutions increased their leverage from 21 to 30 
during the period November 2001-November 2007, 
which was an expansionary phase of the cycle. On 
the contrary, they decreased their leverage (or they 
deleveraged) starting in 2007 when the recession started 
to take hold of the United States economy. 
This means that in the period November 2001-
November 2007 investment banks began to rely more 
on debt financing. During this period, investment 
banks, on average, increased the proportion of assets 
financed by debt from 95% to 98%.19 By increasing 
the proportion of  debt financing, banks became 
riskier. However, at the same time they became more 
16 If  an investment bank has a 30:1 leverage ratio as was the case 
prior to their virtual extinction, the bank can borrow US$ 3,000 
per US$ 100 in capital. If  it is assumed that the rate of interest 
on the loan is 5% and the bank earns 6% on its total new capital 
(3,000 + 100 = 3,100), the bank can earn a profit of US$ 129 (or a 
29% rate of return on the original capital of US$ 100). At a more 
formal level, this can be seen through a simple banking profit 
identity, also known as the Du Pont de Nemours and Company 
return over equity (roe) decomposition, which states that the ratio 
of earnings to equity equals the product of the ratio of earnings 
























As a result, for a given assets to equity ratio, the greater the leverage 
is, the greater the profit opportunities captured by the ratio of 
earnings over equity. However, high leverage ratios also lead to 
very high losses. If  for any reason there is a decline of 10% in the 
value of the total investment of US$ 3,100, the total value of the 
investment after taxes will be equal to US$ 2,940. However, the 
debt is equal to US$ 3,000 and, as a result, the bank has a loss of 
US$ 60. In this case, the investment of the bank in this example is 
based on more than 100% debt. To some extent, this approximates 
the case of some of the investment banks such as Lehman, whose 
investment portfolio was based on 3% equity capital and 97% on 
borrowed funds. See Haughey, J. (2008).
17 To put things in perspective, if  the leverage ratio is equal to 
10, then debt and equity finance represent 90% and 10% of the 
financial intermediary’s acquisition of assets, respectively. With a 
leverage ratio of 34, the respective debt and equity ratios are 97% 
and 3% respectively. Figure 1 lists 37 financial institutions out of 
which 14 are European, 5 are Japanese and 16 are from the United 
States. The two remaining institutions are from the Middle East and 
Asia, respectively. The financial institutions from the United States 
comprise commercial banks, savings institutions, credit unions, 
government-sponsored enterprises and brokers/hedge funds.
18 Adrian and Shin (2008a/, p.3) define pro-cyclical leverage 
management in the following way: “…there is a positive relationship 
between changes in leverage and changes in balance sheet size. Far 
from being passive, financial intermediaries adjust their balance 
sheets actively and do so in such a way that leverage is high during 
booms and low during busts. Leverage is pro-cyclical in this sense.” 
Pro-cyclical leverage entails downward sloping demand curves 
and upward sloping supply curves. As a result the equilibrium 
is unstable. 
19 See footnote 16 above.
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profitable. The empirical evidence shows that during 
this time the net earnings of most investment banks 
more than doubled.20
In the same way that high leverage ratios can 
yield high profits in the upward phase of the cycle, 
the shift to lower leverage ratios in the downward 
phase of the cycle can entail significant losses. This 
is due to the fact that, when balance sheet growth 
is sustained mainly by overborrowing and excessive 
debt, financial institutions will struggle to pay down 
their debts in the downturn by selling assets. The 
losses can become systemic when such sales become 
a widely adopted practice. 
The sole action of one institution may succeed 
in reducing debt and not produce systemic effects. 
However, the same action by many or the most 
important financial institutions and other firms can 
produce systemic effects by igniting a cumulative 
process of  asset debt deflation as changes in debt 
financing (or the adjustment of leverage) and in asset 
prices ‘reinforce each other in an amplification of the 
financial cycle’.21 In this way, pro-cyclical leverage 
management practices entails the propagation of 
contagion through cumulative asset price deflation 
in the distress phase. 
This perverse cumulative process provides a 
working mechanism for financial contagion in the 
present current crisis episode. Indeed, in the case of 
the subprime crisis episode, contagion worked through 
asset price declines and balance sheet contraction. 
FIGURE 1
Leverage ratios for selected financial institutions (2007)
Source: on the basis of  Bloomberg (November, 2008)















Country/Region Average St. Dev.
 United States 15.5 7.2
 Japan 18.0 3.6
 Europe 34.3 10.9
20 Own computations based on Bloomberg (2008). 21 Greenlaw et al. (2008) p. 30.
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These were caused by sharp falls in the asset-backed 
collateral, which in this case consisted of real estate 
mortgages held in large quantities by financial 
institutions.22 The working dynamics of this mechanism 
involved declines in the value of mortgage-backed asset 
securities that were matched by commensurate falls 
in the price of equity and followed by adjustments 
in the leverage ratio through debt reduction achieved 
via the sale of assets. 
The empirical evidence shows that from the 
moment the most recent recession began in November 
2007 in the United States (and the values of assets 
fell due to the sharp decline in house prices), the 
financial sector began a process of  deleveraging. 
Between November 2007 and April 2008, the average 
leverage ratio of investment banks in the United States 
declined from 30 to 24. The deleveraging process was 
accompanied by an average contraction in the value 
of assets of 20% for investment banks.23
In this sense, contrary to other financial crisis 
episodes, the contagion mechanisms in the subprime 
financial crisis did not reflect only the domino effect of 
default.24 As explained by Adrian and Shin (2008 b/ 
p.2), “If the domino effect of financial contagion is the 
relevant one… then defaults on subprime mortgages 
would have had limited impact.25 This is because the 
exposure to the subprime sector is small relative to the 
total size of the balance sheet, and to the capital held 
by the financial institutions themselves. Any defaults 
by subprime borrowers could easily be absorbed by 
the total capital of the financial sector.” 
To summarize, generalized pro-cyclical leverage 
management can lead to widespread debt reduction, 
resulting in an excess supply of  assets that puts 
downward pressures on their price. Then, a continued 
fall in asset prices leads to continued adjustments in 
the leverage ratio which can in turn depress the price 
of assets even further. 
Asset price deflation can have significant effects on 
liquidity as the reductions in equity and contractions 
in balance sheets undermine the capacity of banks 
to lend. Hence, the stage is set for a ‘credit crunch’ 
since, as argued by Greenlaw and others, (2008, p.30) 
aggregate liquidity refers to the rate of  growth of 
balance sheets. 
An analytical exercise undertaken by Greenlaw 
and others (2007) shows that for the current subprime 
crisis a US$ 200 billion loss (such as that suffered by the 
leveraged sector in the United States) can result in an 
aggregate asset contraction equivalent to US$ 2 trillion 
assuming a 5% decline in leverage. In a similar vein, 
a 10% decline in leverage can result in a contraction 
of the financial system aggregate balance sheet of
US$ 3 trillion. In other words, a 5% decline in leverage 
multiplies initial balance sheet losses by 10. A 10% 
decline amplifies initial losses by a factor of 15.
The subprime crisis has led to significant 
contractions in asset prices and financial institutions’ 
balance sheets. The crisis has affected more than 63 of 
the most important financial institutions in the world. 
Recently, it has been estimated that the subprime crisis 
resulted in a loss in the capital valuation of financial 
assets of US$ 50 trillion in 2008 worldwide, which 
is roughly the equivalent of the world’s gdp for that 
year.26 In turn, the contraction in the value of assets 
and the balance sheets of financial institutions has 
led to a notable reduction in credit availability (i.e. 
to a credit crunch).
22 As put by Greenlaw and others (2008, p.31): “…mortgages and 
asset-backed securities built on mortgage assets are held in large 
quantities by leveraged institutions –by the broker dealers themselves 
at the warehousing stage of the securitization process, by hedge 
funds specializing in mortgage securities and by the off-balance 
sheet vehicles that the banks had set up specifically with the purpose 
of  carrying the mortgage securities and the collateralized debt 
obligations that have been written on them.” Federal Reserve data 
shows that these financial institutions held 37% of the mortgage 
debt at the end of the third quarter of 2007.
23 Own computations based of Bloomberg (2008).
24 See for example Adrian and Shin (2008a/ b/); Blanchard (2008); 
Greenlaw et al. (2008); Hatzius (2008). For a supportive but 
critical view of  this balance sheet contagion mechanism see, 
Mishkin (2008). 
25 The domino effect of financial contagion refers to a situation 
where “Bank A has borrowed from bank B, and bank B has 
borrowed from bank C, etc. Then, if  A takes a hit and defaults, 
then bank B will suffer a loss. If  the loss is large enough to wipe 
out B’s capital, then B defaults. Bank C then takes a hit. In turn, 
if  the loss is big enough, bank C defaults, etc. We could dub this 
the “domino” model of financial contagion.” (Adrian and Shin, 
2008 b/p.2).
26 See, Loser (2009).
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The asset price deflation process described in the 
previous section has induced a major reduction in 
household and corporate financial wealth in the 
developed world, inducing a contraction in spending 
that in turn triggered a drop in private consumption 
and investment and, consequently, a contraction of 
aggregate demand. This pattern, which has been 
common to all the developed economies, is expected 
to cause, in 2009, world output to fall by close to 1.5% 
and global international trade by roughly 9.0%. This 
simultaneous contraction in world gdp and international 
trade is a phenomenon that has no precedent in recent 
history. Also, the decline in financial wealth and the 
greater need for financial resources among developed 
economies mean that international financial markets 
could become very illiquid during 2009.
The unprecedented magnitude and global 
reach of the financial crisis have led Latin American 
policymakers to focus their attention on its potential 
impact on the economies of the region. One of the 
main concerns is the intensity and duration of both 
these aspects of the crisis. It should be emphasized, 
however, that most governments in the region have 
announced aggregate demand policies to mitigate the 
effects, a reaction that is somehow different to those 
adopted in previous crisis episodes and one which 
may bring different results. 
On the basis of recent data and past experience, 
the next subsections of the paper examine the future 
performance of Latin American economies as a result of 
the current international financial crisis and the policy 
responses adopted by the governments of the region.
1. The global financial crisis: ‘old wine in new 
goatskins’ for Latin America
As things stand, the available data show that Latin 
American countries are not immune to the contagion 
effects of the current global financial crisis. Moreover, 
the manifestations of  this episode in the region’s 
economies, and their interpretation in light of  the 
analysis of past episodes, suggest that the effects of the 
global financial crisis on Latin American economies 
will conform to previous crisis patterns. 
As in the case of past crises, the current episode 
is having a generalized, deep and protracted negative 
impact on the economies of the region. Indeed, in line 
with the preliminary evidence available in the region and 
the performance of the developed economies, forecasts 
for the region’s growth have been systematically and 
drastically revised downwards since the start of the 
crisis. Given that the crisis is still unfolding, further 
revisions are most likely in order. 
Also, as in past crisis episodes, the available 
evidence shows that the deep and protracted effects 
are strongly associated with the extent to which 
countries face restricted access to external finance 
and contractions in international trade flows. Finally, 
as in the past, the negative economic results and the 
restricted access to external finance is affecting a large 
number of countries across the region regardless of 
their specific characteristics, such as the degree of 
development of  their financial markets, their level 
of integration with international financial markets, 
their trade openness, their export bias, their initial 
conditions prior to the onset of the crisis and their 
policy responses to crises.
2. The effects on real activity
 
The available evidence for the current episode shows 
that the region is heading for a new period of significant 
contraction in economic activity. Thus far, most of the 
lac (7) economies (Argentina, Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia Mexico and 
Peru) have posted negative annual growth rates in 
industrial production (on the basis of monthly indexes), 
a pattern that in some cases has been repeated for 
several months (see figure 2). 
Also, leading indicators of  economic activity, 
such as lending to the private sector and imports, are 
validating the negative expectations arising from the 
behaviour of real activity dynamics. Growth rates of 
credit provided by financial institutions to the private 
III
The potential effects of the global financial  
crisis on Latin American economies
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FIGURE 2
Year-on-year variation in industrial production during the current financial crisis
(Percentages)
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sector are still positive for almost the entire set of 
lac(7) countries.27 However, with the exception of the 
last semester of 2008, credit growth has declined and 
significantly so in countries like Argentina, Colombia 
and Mexico (see figure 3).
This limited evidence and the forecasts for the 
region’s growth for 2009 are consistent with the 
behaviour of  real variables registered during past 
crisis episodes. 
The financial crisis episodes studied here had deep 
and long-lasting effects on economic activity. In all 
the cases considered, they produced a recession in the 
countries affected. Taking the entire sample of crisis 
episodes into account, the average contraction of per 
capita gdp for all countries affected was 6.2%. 
A closer analysis on a case-by-case basis shows 
that the debt crisis was the most costly in terms of 
per capita gdp contractions and also in terms of 
the extent of its contagion effects. Indeed, the debt 
crisis affected all the countries in the sample without 
exception. During that crisis episode, the median 
decline of per capita gdp reached 12.6%. In the other 
episodes, the data also shows a contraction in gdp 
across the region, with a median decline ranging from 
1.2% in the case of the Argentine crisis to 5.4% in the 
Asian-Russian case (see table 4).28 
The negative effects of these crises have been not 
only significant but also persistent. The duration of 
the crisis (defined as a the number of years required to 
recover the pre-crisis gdp level) was 13 years in the case 
of the debt crisis, 5 years in the savings and loan (S&L), 
2 years in the Mexican, 5 years in the Asian-Russian, 
and 3 years in the Argentine crisis episodes.29
In keeping with the evolution of  output, 
unemployment tended to increase during these episodes. 
In general, all the countries included in the sample 
showed an increase in the unemployment rate ranging 
from 1.5 percentage points in the Mexican crisis to 
4.0 percentage points in the Asian-Russian crisis. The 
average increase in unemployment for the whole sample 
was 3.9 percentage points (see table 5).
As in the case of  gdp, the repercussions on 
unemployment were very persistent. The median 
duration (measured in the number of years needed 
to return to pre-crisis levels) of 6 years for the debt 
crisis, 18 years for the S&L and Asian crises, 11 years 
for the Mexican crisis, 8 years for the Asian-Russian 
crisis and 5 years for the Argentine crisis.
For its part, investment also presented drastic and 
persistent reductions across the region. Moreover, the 
drop in per capita investment tended to be significantly 
larger and more persistent than that of output. In 
the most severe of all the crises considered, the debt 
crisis, the contraction of investment was nearly four 
times that of output. In terms of persistence, after that 
crisis, it took per capita investment 15 years to return 
to its pre-crisis level, in other words, two more years 
than it took output to recover (see table 6).
3. The conditions of access to external finance
The effects on economic activity of  the current 
and past episodes have a common denominator in 
the sense that they are strongly associated with the 
region’s restricted access to financial markets and to 
the disruption in international trade flows that occurs 
in periods of economic distress. Both these aspects 
are addressed, respectively, in this and the following 
subsections. 
The extent of the restriction in access to financial 
markets is ascertained by analysing the evolution 
of  changes in both capital inflows and outflows, 
27 In the case of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, credit to the 
private sector has been declining since September of 2008.
28 The maximum and minimum declines were 22.2% (Plurinational 
State of Bolivia) and 0.5% (Dominican Republic) during the debt 
crisis, 28.1% (Peru) and 0.24% (Costa Rica) during the savings and 
loan crisis, 7.8% (Mexico) and 0.13% (Ecuador) during the Mexican 
crisis, 21.7% (Argentina) and 1.6% (Costa Rica) during the Asian-
Russian crisis, and 18.9% (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) and 
0.12% (Guatemala) during the Argentine crisis. The contraction of 
per capita GDP in Argentina during the Argentine crisis episode 
was 16.5%. Authors like Cerra and Chaman-Saxena (2007) argue 
that the large and permanent output costs, induced by political and 
financial crises, could explain why the Latin American region has 
failed to reduce the income gap between the region’s economies and 
the developed ones. Other authors like Calvo and Mendoza (2000), 
Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2006), Edwards (2007) and Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2008b), have presented evidence of how sudden stops 
of capital inflows have induced the collapse of output in emerging 
markets, and in particular, in Latin American economies.
29 The maximum duration of the declining phase of per capita 
gdp that started during the debt crisis was 6 years (Guatemala 
and the Plurinational State of Bolivia) and the minimum one year 
(Dominican Republic), during the S&L crisis those values were 3 
years (Argentina and Peru) and one year (Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Mexico, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay). In the Asian-
Russian episode, the maximum duration of the declining phase was 
5 years (Paraguay) and the minimum one year (Chile, Ecuador, 
Honduras and the Plurinational State of  Bolivia), during the 
Argentine crisis the maximum duration was two years (Argentina, 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Dominican Republic, Mexico, 
Paraguay and Uruguay).
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FIGURE 3
Year-on-year variation in credit to the private sector (banking system) 
during the current financial crisis, in real terms
(Percentages)
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TABLE 4
variation in per capita gdp during previous international financial crisis episodes
Crisis  Countries that Median duration Median decline Years to recover the
 experienced contraction of  the declining phase (Peak-to-trough) pre-crisis level (Median)
 (Number of countries) (Number of years) (Percentages) (Number of years)
1980-83: Debt 17 2 12.6 13
1987-91: Savings and Loan  14 1 2.3 5
1994-95: Mexican  10 1 2.0 2
1997-99: Asian-Russian 12 2 5.4 5
2001-02: Argentine 13 1 1.2 3
Source: own computations based on United Nations statistics (National Accounts database, 2009).
TABLE 5
variation in unemployment during previous international financial crisis episodes
Crisis Episodes
 Countries that Median duration Median increase Years to recover
 experienced increase of  the increase in absolute terms the pre-crisis level
   (Trough-to-peak) (Median)
 (Number of countries) (Number of years) (Percentages) (Number of years)
1980-83: Debta 11 1 3.1 6
1987-91: Savings and Loanb  16 2 2.4 18
1994-95: Mexicanc  17 2 1.5 11
1997-99: Asian-Russianc 15 2 4.0 8
2001-02: Argentinec 17 2 1.9 5
Source: own computations based on World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2009.
a 11 countries in the sample.
b 16 countries in the sample.
c 17 countries in the sample.
TABLE 6
variation in investment during previous international financial crisis episodes
Crisis Episodes Countries Median duration Median decline Years to recover the
 with contraction of  the contraction (Peak-to-trough) pre-crisis level (Median)
 (Number of countries) (Number of years) (Per capita) (Number of years)
1980-83: Debt 17 2 46.6 15
1987-91: Savings and Loan 17 2 16.7 5
1994-95: Mexican  15 1 13.7 4
1997-99: Asian-Russian 16 2 24.4 6
2001-02: Argentine 16 1 13.7 4
Source: own computations based on United Nations statistics (National Accounts Database, 2009).
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which reflect the prevailing conditions in financial 
markets.30
Thus far, the evidence available on the dynamics of 
capital flows (measured as non-foreign direct investment 
(non-fdi) financial flows/gdp) is mixed. Figure 4 shows 
that Argentina and Colombia witnessed a change in 
their situation between 2007 and 2008 from being net 
recipients of non-fdi financial flows to net exporters 
of financial resources. Some economies such as, the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil and Mexico 
have not seen a significant variation in their conditions 
as net recipients of financial flows. Others, such as Chile 
and Peru have even improved their relative position 
in the same period. Nevertheless, at the aggregate 
level for lac(7), the ratio of  non-fdi financial flows 
to gdp dropped by 2% between the third quarter of 
2007 and the third quarter of  2008 (see figure 4).
The restrictions in accessing financial flows are 
not unique to the present episode. It is in fact also 
a prominent feature of all financial crisis episodes 
considered here. The majority of the financial crises 
that have affected the region were characterized by 
“sudden stops” in capital inflows and substantial 
increases in capital outflows.31 The median decline 
in capital inflows, from peak-to-through, was 8.4% 
of gdp during the debt crisis, 2.7% during the S&L 
crisis, 2.9% during the Mexican crisis, 4.4% during the 
Asian-Russian crisis and 4.5% during the Argentine 
crisis (see table 7).32
The reduction in capital inflows was accompanied 
by large capital outflows in the majority of countries. 
The median increase of capital outflows ranged from 
1.2% to 2.9% of gdp in the different crisis episodes 
(see table 8).33 In summary, the average regional 
reduction of net financial flows for the entire sample 
represented approximately 5.8% of gdp.
The drastic reductions in net financial flows were 
not limited to a small set of  countries, but rather 
affected all the countries of the region independently 
of the geographical origin of the crisis, the countries’ 
level of financial development (or initial conditions) 
or the degree of their integration with international 
financial markets. The declines in net capital flows and 
exports worsened the balance-of-payments position, 
inducing adjustments in international reserves and in 
the real exchange rate. 
As in the case of past crises and consistent with the 
current less favourable external conditions, the more 
restricted access to financial flows is accompanied by 
an increase in the cost of accessing external financing. 
The Emerging Markets Bond Index (embi) for most 
economies in the region showed a sharp increase 
between August 2008 and March 2009, reaching a 
maximum in October 2008. This pattern has, with 
different intensity, occurred in all the countries (see 
figure 6).34 
30 In the past three decades, Latin America has faced both financial 
and trade shocks, although their relative importance has tended to 
vary across countries and time periods. Nonetheless, in spite of the 
difficulties in isolating one crisis from another, the evidence shows 
that the region’s gdp performance has had a stronger statistical 
association with the changes in external financial conditions than 
with the behavior of  external aggregate demand. For instance, 
the coefficient of correlation between the gdp cycle and financial 
flows is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level for the 
1980s and 1990s, reaching 0.52 and 0.54, respectively. For its part, 
the correlation of coefficient between the gdp cycle and that of 
the terms of trade was also positive and statistically significant, 
albeit at the 10% level for the 1990s (see Titelman, Perez-Caldentey 
and Minzer, 2008).
31 Several explanations have been proposed to explain the dynamics 
of capital flows. Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2002) and Calvo 
and Talvi (2005) have suggested common financial intermediaries 
play a role in the sudden and generalized stop of financial flows. 
Calvo and Reinhart (1996) have pointed out the spillover effects 
that large neighbours could have in other smaller economies, and 
Calvo and Mendoza (1996) and Chari and Kehoe (2002) have argued 
that herd behavior by financial investors also explains why financial 
resources stop flowing to emerging market economies. 
32 There are also differences in the duration of the decline in inflows. 
The maximum duration of the declining phase during the debt
crisis was 6 years (El Salvador) and the minimum one year (Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela and Guatemala), during the S&L crisis the 
maximum value was 3 years (Argentina and Honduras) and the 
minimum one year (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru). 
During the Mexican crisis the maximum duration was 2 years 
(Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Panama and Paraguay) and the minimum one year (Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic Ecuador, El Salvador 
and Peru). In the Asian-Russian case, the maximum duration was 
5 years (Argentina, overlapping with other crisis episodes) and the 
minimum duration one year (Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Panama,). During 
the Argentine crisis episode the declining phase of inflows had a 
maximum duration of 4 years (Plurinational State of Bolivia) and 
one year in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Uruguay.
33 Some studies, including Cuddington (1986), Dooley (1986) 
and Pineda (1998), have suggested that capital outflows, and in 
particular, capital outflows by private non-financial institutions, 
are the reaction of individuals in response to change in domestic 
risk that could be induced by an increase in expropriation risk, 
devaluation risk or inflation risk or any other changes in the 
expected return on domestic assets, in addition to changes in 
other fundamentals.
34 The changes in the embi indicator, as well as other variables, 
for some countries in the region, has reflected not only the 
deterioration of their external conditions, but also the increase 
in risk associated with idiosyncratic political considerations that 
explain the differences in the embi level in the cases of the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela and Argentina.
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FIGURE 4
Non-fdi financial flows during the current financial crisis
(One-year cumulative values as percentages of gdp)
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FIGURE 5
Non-fdi financial flows during the current financial crisis
(Year-on-year variations in terms of gdp)
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TABLE 7
Capital inflows during previous international financial crisis episodes
Crisis Episodes Countries that Median duration Median absolute decline
 experienced contraction of  the contraction (Peak-to-trough)
 (Number of countries) (Number of years) (Percentages of gdp)
1980-83: Debt 17 2 8.4
1987-91: Savings and Loan 17 1 2.7
1994-95: Mexican  14 2 2.9
1997-99: Asian-Russian 17 2 4.4
2001-02: Argentine 16 2 4.5
Source: own computations based on eclac (2009).
TABLE 8
Capital outflows during previous international financial crises episodes
Crisis Episodes Countries that Median duration Median absolute increase
 experienced an increase of  the increase (Peak-to-trough)
 (Number of countries) (Number of years) (Percentages of gdp)
1980-83: Debt 15 1 1.2
1987-91: Savings and Loan 17 2 1.8
1994-95: Mexican  17 1 2.1
1997-99: Asian-Russian 17 1 1.4
2001-02: Argentine 17 1 2.9
Source: own computations based on eclac (2009).
FIGURE 6
Latin America (8 countries): recent evolution of embi 
(Basis points)
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4. Export dynamics in the present and past 
crisis episodes
Besides being strongly related to the curtailment of 
financial flows in terms of volume and cost, the effects 
on economic activity of past and current episodes 
are also significantly associated with the disruption 
of international trade flows. More to the point, as in 
previous crisis episodes, export dynamics are playing 
an important role in transmitting the effects of the 
current financial crisis to the region. 
The significant recession that has affected the 
developed world and the slowdown of  the main 
market emerging economies have induced a significant 
reduction of  global international trade, which is 
expected to decline by more than 9% in 2009 (wto, 
2009). The resulting decline in world aggregate demand 
has induced a sharp reduction in commodities prices, 
and similar conditions are projected to prevail in the 
near future.35
Moreover, the contraction of the external demand 
for manufacturing goods will also affect the capacity 
of  Latin American countries to restrain the drop 
in non-commodity exports. Figure 7 illustrates the 
dynamics of lac(7) exports during 2007 and 2008 
and shows that the annual growth rate of exports36 
for all of the lac(7) economies has been negative or 
has presented a significant slowdown since the second 
semester of 2008.37
In past international financial crises the region 
also faced a contraction in external aggregate demand 
that was reflected in the decline of exports during 
those episodes.38 On average, for the entire sample (all 
countries and all crisis episodes), the contraction of 
exports was 19.1%. The largest reductions in exports 
took place during the debt crisis and the Asian-Russian 
episode. The median decline of exports reached 38.2% 
in the former and 13.9% in the latter (see table 9).39 
The shocks to exports also tended to be very 
persistent in all the crisis episodes. The median duration 
required for exports to recover their pre-crisis level 
was 10 years for the debt crisis, 7 years for the S&L 
crisis, 3 years for the Mexican crisis, 4 years for the 
Asian-Russian episode and 3 years for the Argentine 
episode. 
As in past financial crises, the curtailment in 
financial flows and the drop in exports have resulted 
in a decline in the stock of international reserves for 
most economies (see figure 8).
The drops registered in international reserves 
for this episode are in line with those registered in 
past crisis episodes which ranged from 19% in the 
35 Between March 2008 and April 2009, oil prices declined by 
53% in the case of West Texas Intermediate, close to US$ 50 per 
barrel. In the same period, the JP Morgan composite commodities 
index indicates a contraction of 40%. For 2009, IMF estimates a 
reduction of 31.8% in oil prices and of 18.7% in prices for non-
fuel commodities.
36 Year-on-year variation as a percentage.
37 For those countries in which exports fell (Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico and Peru) the median decline was 29.3% 
TABLE 9
Exports during previous international financial crisis episodes
Crisis Episodes Countries Median duration Median decline Years to recover the
 with contraction of  the contraction (Peak-to-trough) pre-crisis level (Median)
 (Number of countries) (Number of years) (Per capita) (Number of years)
1980-83: Debt 17 3 38.2 10
1987-91: Savings and Loan 17 1 10.7 7
1994-95: Mexican  10 1 4.1 3
1997-99: Asian-Russian 14 1 13.9 4
2001-02: Argentine 14 1 10.7 3
Source: own computations based on eclac (2009).
between the fourth quarter of 2007 and the fourth quarter of 2008, 
and the difference in the growth rate for the country that posted 
a slowdown in exports (Brazil) was more than 12.7 percentage 
points for the same period.
38 The importance of international trade as a crisis propagation 
channel was stressed by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996). 
39 During the debt crisis, the maximum reduction of  exports, 
peak-to-trough, was 72% (Plurinational State of Bolivia) and the 
minimum was 14% (Mexico). In the S&L crisis, the maximum 
was 39% (Brazil) and the minimum 0.6% (Guatemala). During 
the Mexican crisis, the maximum reduction was 29% (Paraguay) 
and the minimum 3.13% Guatemala. During the Asian-Russian 
episode the maximum cumulative reduction of exports was 42% 
(Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) and the minimum was 2.9% 
(Chile). In the Argentine crisis, the maximum decline in exports 
was 29.9% (Ecuador) and the minimum 1% (Argentina).
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FIGURE 7
Exports during the current financial crisis
(Year-on-year variations as percentages)
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FIGURE 8
international reserves during the current financial crisis
(Year-on-year variations as percentages)
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Mexican crisis and the Asian-Russian crisis, to 43% 
in the debt crisis (see table 10).40 
Traditionally, international financial crises have 
been accompanied by deterioration in the stock markets 
and the depreciation of the nominal exchange rates 
across the region. During the current financial crisis, 
at least in its initial stages, there was an apparent, or 
temporal, decoupling of the dynamics of these markets 
in the region from those in the developed world. Both 
the stock markets and the nominal exchange rates of 
countries in the region were getting stronger while 
those markets in the developed world were sinking. 
This behaviour seems to have come to an end during 
the second semester of 2008, and the stock markets 
in lac(7) have declined since June of 2008.
TABLE 10
international reserves during previous international financial crisis episodes
(United States dollars)
Crisis Episodes Countries with Median duration Median decline
 contraction of  the contraction (Peak-to-trough)
 (Number of countries) (Number of years) (Percentages)
1980-83: Debt 17 1 42.7
1987-91: Savings and loan 15 1 40.5
1994-95: Mexican  9 1 19.1
1997-99: Asian-Russian 15 1 18.7
2001-02: Argentine 11 2 37.3
Source: own computations based on eclac (2009).
Regarding the dynamics of the nominal exchange 
rate, during this crisis episode, the exchange rate of 
lac(7) went through two distinct phases. Until July of 
2008, most of the nominal exchange rates across the 
region tended to appreciate. However, since August 
2008, most countries have witnessed significant 
depreciations of their exchange rate, of more than 
30% in the case of Mexico and Brazil.41 
In a context of lower exports and a deceleration in 
net capital inflows, the growth rate of the international 
reserves of the lac(7) economies has slowed down 
significantly since the second semester of 2008. The 
median deceleration of  the international reserves 
growth rate between the second semester of 2007 and 
the second semester of 2008 was 6.9%.
40 Notice that the adoption of more flexible exchange rate regimes 
in some countries has reduced their need for holding international 
reserves as a buffer stock to defend exchange rate parities or 
bands.
41 The official exchange rate of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
has not been modified since March of 2005.
IV
Conclusion
The staggering effects of the current global financial 
crisis can be explained by the combination of  off  
balance sheet funding and pro-cyclical leverage 
management. 
Off balance sheet funding practices provided the 
basis for the gestation of the crisis. Off balance sheet 
practices seemingly separated the risk of investing in 
an asset or asset-backed security (financial risk) from 
the risk associated with the originator of the asset or 
security and even from the risk of the asset or security 
itself (real risk). Moreover, off balance sheet practices, 
through credit enhancement techniques, blurred 
the distinction between the relative risks of a broad 
spectrum of assets. As a result, risk perceptions on 
assets tended to move in tandem with the boom and 
bust phases of the crisis. In the boom phase, assets 
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were considered ‘prime’, while in the bust phase they 
were downgraded to the ‘subprime’ category.
The effects of  off  balance sheet funding were 
amplified by pro-cyclical leverage management practices. 
Pro-cyclical leverage management meant that financial 
institutions pursued a strategy of expanding their asset 
base by relying on debt financing in the boom phase. 
Then, in the bust phase, they would try to reduce 
their debt. The generalized practice of pro-cyclical 
management resulted in cumulative increases in asset 
prices in the boom phase and cumulative declines in 
the bust phase.
Generalized and continued asset price deflation 
in the bust phase contracted the balance sheets of 
financial institutions and curtailed their capacity to 
lend, which set the stage for a worldwide credit crunch 
and the ensuing global slowdown. 
The effects of the crisis are being felt not only 
by developed countries but also by developing 
countries. In the case of Latin America, the analysis 
and the empirical evidence suggest that the current 
episode and its manifestations are likely to conform 
to previous crisis patterns. That is, the current global 
financial crisis is “old wine in new goatskins” for 
Latin America. 
Previous crisis patterns are epitomized by their 
deep and lasting negative effects on the economic 
performance of the region. These are explained mainly 
by the extent to which countries face restricted access 
to external finance and the disruption of international 
trade flows. Moreover, in accordance with previous 
crisis patterns, the negative economic results and the 
restricted access to external finance are affecting a 
large number of countries across the region regardless 
of  their specific characteristics, such as the degree 
of  development of  their financial markets, their 
integration with international financial markets, the 
openness of their economies, their exports bias, their 
initial economic conditions and the policy responses 
taken by their governments. 
In the current crisis episode countries also face 
restricted access to finance and severe disruptions in 
international trade flows. Since the second semester of 
2008, private financial flows have been slowing down 
and even reversing in some countries. The median 
reduction in non-fdi financial flows between the 
third quarter of 2007 and the third quarter of 2008 
was 2% of gdp. Furthermore, private capital flows to 
the region are projected to be significantly smaller in 
2009 than in 2008 (50%) and global trade is expected 
to fall by more than 9% during 2009. Some countries 
in the region have already been witnessing declines 
since the second semester of 2008.
Contrary to previous episodes, the current crisis 
has found the economies of the region in better fiscal 
and macroeconomic conditions, which translate into 
high levels of foreign assets and low unemployment 
and inflation rates. This improved macro context has 
allowed countries to adopt counter-cyclical policies 
to mitigate, at least initially, the negative effects of 
the severe contraction of external aggregate demand, 
as well as the possible reduction of  international 
financial flows.42 
As a result, the strength of the expected effects 
of the crisis on Latin American economies will be 
ultimately determined by the duration and intensity 
of the crisis in the developed economies and by the 
effectiveness of the counter-cyclical policies that the 
governments of the region have announced.
(Original: English)
42 See cepal (2009).
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